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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF
AMICUS CURIAE
The interests of amicus curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law
is set forth in the accompanying Motion for Leave to File.
INTRODUCTION
Judges are keenly aware of the difference it makes when a client is
represented by a lawyer in court. This difference is even more pronounced
when the client is a child. As this Court has recognized, dependency
proceedings threaten a child’s liberty interests, as “the child will be
physically removed from the parent’s home,” and “become[s] a ward of
the State,” facing “the daunting challenge of having his or her person put
in the custody of the State as a foster child, powerless and voiceless, to be
forced to move from one foster home to another.” In re Dependency of
M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d 1, 16, 271 P.3d 234 (2012). The seriousness of these
threats to a child’s physical and fundamental liberties compels this Court
to recognize that Washington’s due process jurisprudence must provide
the “‘guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings.’”1 It is only
through counsel that children exercise the most fundamental dignity of due
process—the right to be heard.

1

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932).

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In determining whether children have a right to counsel in
dependency proceedings under article I, section 3 of the Washington
Constitution, the Court need not justify its interpretation of article I,
section 3 through a formal Gunwall2 analysis. Using Gunwall as an
interpretive tools rather than a rote test ensures fidelity to Gunwall’s
central purpose—that state constitutional decisions “be made for well
founded legal reasons”3—and encourages more robust exploration of the
arguments that will guide principled development of state constitutional
jurisprudence. See City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of
Christ, 166 Wn.2d 633, 641, 211 P.3d 406 (2009) (“Gunwall is better
understood to prescribe appropriate arguments”).
With this understanding, amicus documents how Washington has
already made a principled departure from federal due process in the right
to counsel context. Article I, section 3 affords the right to counsel if either
fundamental liberty interests or physical liberty interests are at stake.
Compare In re Grove, 127 Wn.2d 221, 237, 897 P.2d 1252 (1995) (right
to counsel when proceedings concern fundamental or physical liberty
interests), with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. Of Durham Cty., N.C.,

2
3

State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 62-63, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
Id. at 62.

2

452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981) (right to counsel
attaches at most only when physical liberty is at stake). Washington’s due
process jurisprudence must therefore recognize that children have a right
to counsel in dependency proceedings, where both their fundamental and
physical liberty interests are very much at stake.
Finally, employing Gunwall factor 4 (preexisting state law) and
factor 6 (matters of state and local concern), as well as policy arguments,
amicus demonstrates that Washington law in fact already recognizes the
critical role that a child’s attorney plays in dependency proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

WASHINGTON COURTS NEED NOT APPLY GUNWALL
TO JUSTIFY DECISIONS BASED ON THE STATE
CONSTITUTION.
As this Court articulated in an opinion authored by the late Justice

Robert Utter, Washington courts “will first independently interpret and
apply the Washington constitution in order, among other concerns, to
develop a body of independent jurisprudence, and because consideration
of the United States Constitution first would be premature.” State v. Coe
101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984). The different histories and
purposes of the state and federal constitutions “clearly demonstrate that
the protection of the fundamental rights of Washington citizens was
intended to be and remains a separate and important function of our state

3

constitution and courts that is closely associated with our sovereignty.” Id.
at 374. “When a state court neglects its duty to evaluate and apply its state
constitution, it deprives the people of their double security.” Alderwood
Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wn.2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108 (1981)
(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. Smith, 117
Wn.2d 263, 283, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring) (observing
that “[s]tate constitutions were originally intended to be the primary
devices to protect individual rights.”). Amicus supports petitioners’ request
that this Court rely on the state constitution to protect fundamental due
process rights, and in so doing, continue to “develop a body of
independent jurisprudence” in the right to counsel context. State v.
Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (citing Coe, 101
Wn.2d at 373-74) (in a search case, considering petitioner’s arguments
under article I, section 7 first, rather than under the Fourth Amendment).
Amicus urges this Court to reiterate that where, as here, litigants
invoke the state constitution and provide an argument on which to grant
relief, Washington courts are free to develop state constitutional
jurisprudence without a formal Gunwall analysis to justify using our own
constitution. Compare M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 20 n.11 (even though the
child’s recognized liberty interests were potentially greater than those of
the parents, declining to consider article I, section 3 because petitioner had

4

not provided Gunwall briefing until her supplemental brief), with City of
Woodinville, 166 Wn.2d at 641-42 (“A strict rule that courts will not
consider state constitutional claims without a complete Gunwall analysis
could return briefing into an antiquated writ system where parties may
lose their constitutional rights by failing to incant correctly. Gunwall is
better understood to prescribe appropriate arguments: if the parties provide
argument on state constitutional provisions and citation, a court may
consider the issue.”).4 Rather, amicus suggests the Gunwall factors are
best understood as interpretive tools that may guide development of a
particular constitutional doctrine. See State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769,
958 P.2d 982 (1998) (“Our inquiry is no longer whether article I, section 7
provides greater protection but, rather, does the scope of the protection
apply to the facts of the case….Once we agree that our prior cases direct

4
This Court’s recent pronouncement in City of Woodinville is an answer to
courts’ and litigants’ reliance on State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797
(1988), in which this Court declined to reach the state constitutional issue on account of
inadequate Gunwall briefing. While Wethered was “repeatedly used as the basis for
blocking access to state constitutional arguments for lack of adequate Gunwall briefing,”
Justice Utter’s intent in Wethered was to “steer…[the] court toward using the Gunwall
criteria as interpretive tools rather than as a magic key to the walled kingdom of the state
constitution.” Hugh Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional
Jurisprudence: “Gunwall is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 37 Rutgers L.J. 1169, 1180
(2006); see also Hugh Spitzer, Which Constitution? 11 Years of Gunwall in Washington
State, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1187, 1205-06, 1211 (1998) (discussing how, in the nine
years following Wethered, the decision had the practical effect of almost destroying the
use of the state constitution, because the Court “proceeded to massively reject state
constitutional arguments that were not accompanied by full Gunwall briefings.”).

5

the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall
analysis is no longer helpful or necessary.”); Hugh D. Spitzer, New Life
for the “Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall
is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 37 Rutgers L.J. 1169, 1183 (2006) (the
Gunwall factors are useful interpretive tools for defining the nature of the
heightened protection afforded by the state constitution).

II.

THIS COURT HAS ALREADY MADE A PRINCIPLED
DEPARTURE FROM FEDERAL DUE PROCESS IN THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL CONTEXT, AFFORDING COUNSEL
WHERE THERE ARE EITHER FUNDAMENTAL OR
PHYSICAL LIBERTY INTERESTS AT STAKE.
Though the federal and Washington constitutions employ nearly

identical language in guaranteeing due process of law, Washington has
already construed article I, section 3 as providing more protection than the
Fourteenth Amendment in the right to counsel context. The right to
counsel under article I, section 3 attaches where “the litigant’s physical
liberty is threatened or where a fundamental liberty interest…is at risk.” In
re Grove, 127 Wn.2d at 237 (emphasis added). This is in sharp contrast
with federal due process, which limits the right to counsel, at most, to
situations “where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25; see also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S.
431, 443, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 180 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2011) (statements about

6

right to counsel from Lassiter “are best read as pointing out that the Court
previously had found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases involving
incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such cases” (citing
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25) (emphasis in original)). Therefore, article I,
section 3 guarantees counsel for parents in termination and dependency
proceedings, due to the fundamental liberty interests at stake. In re the
Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 137-38, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); In re the
Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252, 254-55, 533 P.2d 841 (1975); see also
King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 383 n.3, 174 P.3d 659 (2007) (recognizing
that the federal due process underpinnings of Luscier and Myricks “may
have been eroded by the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter” but
noting that Luscier and Myricks were “favorably cited more recently in
our case, In re Dependency of Grove”); In re Welfare of Hall, 99 Wn.2d
842, 846, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983) (affirming that parents’ categorical right
to counsel in child deprivation proceedings is now based “solely in state
law”).5
Because Washington courts already recognize that the right to
counsel under article I, section 3 is materially different than under federal

5
Luscier and Myricks preceded Gunwall, which has not affected this Court’s
suggestion that the cases retain their vitality.

7

due process, the sole question to be resolved is how to apply the state
constitution.6

III.

RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS IS CONSISTENT WITH
STATE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE, BECAUSE
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS THREATEN A CHILD’S
FUNDAMENTAL AND PHYSICAL LIBERTY INTERESTS.
Because the purpose of procedural due process is to protect

constitutionally recognized rights, a meaningful state constitutional
analysis must examine the nature of the rights said to be protected by due
process. Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 710-11, 257 P.3d 570
(2011) (stating that “context matters” in a due process analysis, and
recognizing the context of that case had to be defined by examining the
rights implicated in an initial truancy hearing). In dependency
proceedings, children, unlike parents, have both fundamental and physical
liberty interests at stake, necessitating appointment of counsel to protect
those interests.

6

This is the question the Court of Appeals should have addressed, rather than
inquiring whether there was justification for independent state constitutional analysis.
Matter of Dependency of S.K-P., 200 Wn. App. 86, 101-07, 401 P.3d 442 (2017).

8

While this Court did not consider article I, section 3 in M.S.R., 174
Wn.2d at 15-23,7 this Court recognized and articulated children’s liberty
interests at stake in dependency proceedings, for purposes of Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).
Dependency proceedings implicate the child’s physical liberty interests
“because the child will be physically removed from the parent’s home,”
and it is the child who “become[s] a ward of the State” and faces “the
daunting challenge of having his or her person put in the custody of the
State as a foster child, powerless and voiceless, to be forced to move from
one foster home to another.” M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 16. “Foster home
placement may result in multiple changes of homes, schools, and friends
over which the child has no control.” Id. This Court concluded that “the
child’s liberty interest in a dependency proceeding is very different from,
but at least as great as, the parent’s.” Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added).8

7
This Court considered children’s right to counsel in the termination of parental
rights context under federal due process in M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 15-23, and determined
there was no universal right to counsel, id. at 22-23. Because the petitioner raised the
state due process claims for the first time on appeal, id. ¶ 2, this Court declined to
consider whether article I, section 3 required appointmentment of counsel, id. at 20 n.11.
This Court concluded that “this case does not provide us with a vehicle to consider the
entire scope of the article I, section 3 right in this context.” Id. (emphasis added). This
case is the proper vehicle for full consideration of whether article I, section 3 requires a
categorical right to counsel for children in dependency proceedings.
8
In addition to the physical and fundamental liberty interests at stake, other
rights are also implicated in the dependency proceeding, as articulated by S.K.-P. Supp.
Br. of S.K.-P. at 5-6 (detailing state and federal constitutional and statutory rights to
education, privacy, religion, culture, speedy resolution of dependency proceedings, and
freedom of speech).

9

Further, children’s liberty interests at stake differ in “degree and in
kind” to those of their parents. Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional
Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev.
663, 676 (2006). The risk of harm children face in dependency is
irreparable. Id. While parents “may disagree with absolutely everything
that is happening to them and their family, their cognitive awareness and
understanding of the proceedings better enables them to survive the
trauma. Their children, by contrast, suffer confusion and anxiety on top of
everything else.” Id. at 677. Further, the children’s interests may be
nuanced, existing somewhere between the binary interests of the parent
and the state. Id.
The child may have an interest in a limited form of state
intervention short of removal and placement into foster care—an
interest that is at odds with the parent’s and that can only be
vindicated with a judicial determination of dependency. For
example, the child’s right to remain with her intact biological
family and her right to be safe can both be protected with a judicial
order that permits the child to remain at home but that also requires
her parent to attend an outpatient substance abuse or other
community-based social service program.
Id. at 678 (internal citations omitted).
A child’s diverse liberty interests at stake in dependency
proceedings—as explicitly recognized by this Court in M.S.R., and as
explained by merits counsel and all amici in the case—form a principled
and reasoned basis to require provision of counsel. Given this Court’s

10

determination that parents are entitled to counsel in dependency
proceedings, where there are fundamental liberty interests but not physical
liberty interests at stake, so too should children be guaranteed counsel in
dependency proceedings because both physical liberty and fundamental
liberties are at stake.9, 10 Any other conclusion creates internal
inconsistency with this Court’s decisions in Luscier, Myricks, and Grove.

9

This Court has recognized that case by case-by-case determinations of the need
for counsel are “unwieldy, time-consuming, and costly. The proceeding might itself
require appointment of counsel.” King, 162 Wn.2d at 390 n.11. Further, without counsel,
there is an intolerable risk that dependency determinations may be plagued by erroneous
fact finding. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762–63, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1399–
400, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (noting the risk of erroneous fact finding in the context of
deprivation proceedings, due to subjective statutory standards and to proceedings
vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias).
10
In reaching this conclusion, there is no concern that this Court will be
“substituting [its] notion of justice for that of…the United States Supreme Court.”
Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d at 63. As discussed above, this Court has already held article I,
section 3 to be more protective than the Fourteenth Amendment in some right to counsel
contexts. And, in any event, there is no federal precedent addressing whether children in
dependency proceedings have a constitutional right to counsel. Because federal due
process is silent on children’s right to counsel in the dependency setting, a direct
comparison is both unnecessary and impossible. It is undeniable that while the U.S.
Supreme Court has considered parents’ rights in the termination context, Lassiter, 452
U.S. at 31-32, it has never considered children’s rights to counsel within the dependency
context.

11

IV.

APPLICATION OF GUNWALL AND OTHER
INTERPRETIVE TOOLS DEMONSTRATES THAT
PROVISION OF COUNSEL TO CHILDREN IN
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS ENSURES THEIR EQUAL
VOICE.
The Gunwall factors help “both attorneys and judges

systematically analyze a challenging question from a variety of angles that
courts have always used, consciously or unconsciously, to evaluate cases.”
Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria Tests”, supra, at 1184.11 Factor 4,
preexisting state law, includes consideration of the myriad ways in which
preexisting state law protects children’s liberty interests. Factor 6, whether
a matter is of particular state or local concern, also appropriately includes
an examination of how Washington has moved towards greater protections
for minors in child welfare cases. Further, pre-Gunwall decisions support
a state due process doctrine that is more protective than under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
a. Preexisting State Law Already Recognizes the Unique Role
Counsel Plays in a Dependency Proceeding.
Preexisting state law demonstrates Washington’s recognition that it
is only counsel who can give children a meaningful opportunity to be

11
Amicus here provides further discussion of factors 4 and 6 to supplement the
parties’ state due process and Gunwall arguments. See Supp. Br. of E.H. at 7-11; Supp.
Br. of S.K.-P. at 7-10, 8 n.10; Supp. Br. of DSHS at 22-28; see also State v. Foster, 135
Wn.2d 441, 461, 957 P.2d 712 (1998) (citations omitted) recognizing that factors 4 and 6
are unique to the context in which the interpretation arises)).

12

heard in the context of a dependency proceeding. Provision of counsel to
children in dependency proceedings is consistent with Washington’s
common law that has long championed the welfare of the child in the
deprivation context. As early as the turn of the 20th century, our Supreme
Court recognized the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration
in termination proceedings. Ex Parte Day, 189 Wash. 368, 382, 65 P.2d
1049 (1937) (“The two principles, then, the welfare of the child and the
right of the parent, must be considered together, the former being the more
weighty.” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Rasch, 24 Wash. 332, 335,
64 P. 531 (1901) (“It is no slight thing to deprive a parent of the care,
custody, and society of a child, or a child of the protection, guidance, and
affection of the parent.”).
Further, this Court has recognized the importance of appointed
counsel for children, as counsel provides different and greater protection
than a guardian ad litem. In In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 679, 712
n.29, 122 P.3d 161 (2005), amicus argued, like amicus does here, that the
child should have appointed counsel. Because none of the parties had
raised the issue, the court declined to address it. Id. Importantly, however,
the court “urge[d] trial courts…to consider the interests of children in
dependency [and] parentage…proceedings, and whether appointing
counsel, in addition to and separate from the appointment of a GAL, to act

13

on their behalf and represent their interests would be … in the interests of
justice.” Id. (citing RCW 13.34.100(6); RCW 26.09.110; King County
LFLR 13) (emphasis added). The court noted that when “adjudicating the
best interests of the child, we must…remain centrally focused on those
whose interests with which we are concerned, recognizing that not only
are they often the most vulnerable, but also powerless and voiceless.” Id.
(quotations omitted).
If courts are to remain centrally focused on the child’s interests, it
is necessary that counsel be appointed to articulate the child’s actual
interests.12 It is only counsel who, with the attendant legal training and
ethical responsibilities, has the duty to listen to the child and articulate the
child’s stated interests to the court.13 Without counsel, the court cannot
fully understand what is at stake for the child from the child’s own
perspective, and therefore is not well positioned to successfully work

12

See also infra note 13, explaining that a guardian ad litem is responsible only
for advancing the child’s best interests, which can vary drastically from the child’s stated
interest, and are necessarily a subjective determination on the part of the guardian ad
litem.
13
RPC 1.2(a) (requiring counsel to abide by the client’s decisions concerning
the objectives of representation). A guardian ad litem, in contrast, has no ethical
obligation to advance the actual interests of the child; the Guardian Ad Litem rules
recognize that the statutory best interests of the child may expressly conflict with the
stated interests of the child. Guardian Ad Litem Rule 2(a) (“A guardian ad litem shall
represent the best interests of the person for whom she or he is appointed. Representation
of best interests may be inconsistent with the wishes of the person whose interest the
guardian ad litem represents.”).

14

through the often complicated and nuanced solutions that might best
protect the child’s liberty interests at stake.14
Additionally, the history of state statutory law provides important
context for this Court’s analysis of factors 4 and 6, as it demonstrates the
legislature’s recognition of the unique role of counsel.15 In its 2010
amendments to RCW 13.34.100, 13.34.105, and 13.34.215, the legislature
added a new section that specifically found that “inconsistent practices in
and among counties in Washington…resulted in few children being
notified of their right to request legal counsel.” Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 1.
The legislature’s recognition of the importance of providing counsel to
children in dependencies in fact applies to all dependencies:
Attorneys…have different skills and obligations than guardians ad
litem and court-appointed special advocates, especially in forming
a confidential and privileged relationship with a child….Welltrained attorneys can provide legal counsel to a child on issues
such as placement options, visitation rights, educational rights,
access to services while in care and services available to a child
upon aging out of care. Well-trained attorneys for a child can:

14

Consider how Judge Erik Pitchal, who, when an advocate at Legal Aid
Society, represented two brothers in dependency proceedings and was able to achieve his
clients’ objective to “get them out of that ‘crazy foster care system’ and reunite them with
their Aunt.” Pitchal, supra, at 665. He “served discovery demands and interrogatories on
the agency and showed up at the hearing with two banker’s boxes of documents and
lengthy notes for cross-examination of the caseworker.” Id. His advocacy materially
affected the outcome of the proceedings: “[t]he judge was shocked, the agency attorney
was not interested in a fight, and we settled the case….[the brothers] were soon on their
way to South Carolina with the aunt.” Id. The brothers “were together, they were with
family, and they had some measure of peace.” Id.
15
Gunwall itself explains that state statutes assist in determining what the proper
scope of a constitutional right may be. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 61-62.
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(a) Ensure the child’s voice is considered in judicial proceedings;
(b) Engage the child in his or her legal proceedings;
(c) Explain to the child his or her legal rights;
(d) Assist the child, through the attorney's counseling role, to
consider the consequences of different decisions; and
(e) Encourage accountability, when appropriate, among the
different systems that provide services to children.
Id. The 2010 amendments also require that both the state and the guardian
ad litem notify a child of twelve years old or older of the right to request
an attorney, and further requires the state and the guardian ad litem to ask
the child whether he or she wishes an attorney. Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 2.
Then, in 2014, the legislature again amended RCW 13.34.100.
Laws of 2014, ch. 108, § 2. The amendments established a right to counsel
for dependent children where there is no parent remaining with parental
rights. Id. The amendments also permit judges to appoint counsel to
children in any dependency action, either sua sponte or “upon the request
of a parent, the child, a guardian ad litem, a caregiver, or the department.”
Id. This increased protectiveness of the right to counsel militates strongly
in favor of independent interpretation.
Finally, Washington’s contraction of the right of criminal
defendants to confront witnesses provides an illustrative contrast to the
expansion of the right to counsel. In State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441, 957
P.2d 712 (1998), the court observed that over time, Washington statutory
and case law had carved out more and more exceptions to the right for a
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defendant to confront witnesses, which cut against independent analysis
under the state constitution. Id. at 463-65 (“In recent years, the exceptions
to the right have been enlarged….Preexisting law does not support an
independent analysis of our state confrontation clause in the context of the
present case.”). Conversely, while federal law does not recognize a right to
counsel for parents or children, Washington law has expanded to
recognize a right to counsel for parents both statutorily (RCW
13.34.090(2)) and constitutionally (Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135; Myricks, 85
Wn.2d 252), and as discussed above, the legislature has expanded the
reach of RCW 13.34.100 over time.
b. Pre-Gunwall Decisions Provide Public Policy Rationales
for Interpreting Article I, Section 3 as Providing Greater
Protection than Federal Due Process.
The Gunwall court made clear that the six factors are
“nonexclusive,” and the Gunwall interpretive tools are certainly no bar to
the Court examining its own jurisprudence prior to June, 1986, when
Gunwall was decided. 106 Wn.2d at 58. This Court can and should
consider Washington’s due process jurisprudence prior to Gunwall. In
State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984), and State v.
Davis, 38 Wn. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143 (1984), our courts held that article
I, section 3 mandated greater protection than federal due process.
In Bartholomew, this Court held that article I, section 3 was
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offended by Washington’s death penalty statute, which permitted the jury
in the sentencing phase to consider any evidence, even if the evidence was
inadmissible under the rules of evidence. 101 Wn.2d at 640. The Court
reasoned that article I, section 3 would not tolerate a statute that provided
lesser protection to those facing a capital sentence, and that the statute was
“contrary to the reliability of evidence standard embodied in the due
process clause of our state constitution.” Id. at 640-41. The Court noted
that even if its analysis were incorrect under federal law, its interpretation
of article I, section 3 was not constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 639.
In Davis, Division I of the Court of Appeals held that use of a
juvenile defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment, regardless of
whether the silence followed Miranda warnings, was fundamentally unfair
and violated article I, section 3. 38 Wn. App. at 605. Federal law allowed
the use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes if
the defendant had not received Miranda warnings. Id. at 604-05 (citing
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982)).
The court declined to follow federal law, reasoning that limiting the
exclusion of post-arrest silence to instances where Miranda warnings are
given would penalize a defendant who had not been advised of his rights.
Id. As a matter of public policy, the court was concerned that following
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Fletcher “might also encourage police to delay reading Miranda warnings
or to dispense with them altogether to preserve the opportunity to use the
defendant’s silence against him.” Id. at 605.
These cases demonstrate courts relying on policy rationales to
extend heightened due process protections. This Court’s previous right to
counsel cases alone justify provision of counsel to children in dependency
proceedings, and that result is both consistent with other preexisting state
law and supported by compelling policy rationales. See generally Br. of
Amici Curiae Children’s Rights, Inc., et al.

CONCLUSION
Amicus urges the Court to hold that article I, section 3 requires
provision of counsel to children in dependency proceedings, due to the
physical and liberty interests at stake. See Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309
U.S. 551, 557, 60 S. Ct. 676, 84 L. Ed. 920 (1940) (declaring that “state
courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state
constitutions”). This development in right to counsel state due process
jurisprudence will ensure the dignity of children as participants in the legal
process. Separately, it will provide guidance for lower courts and litigants
about how to meaningfully employ Gunwall when seeking to develop
Washington’s constitutional law.
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